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Abstract 
 We demonstrate that extant parametric specifications of Cumulative Prospect 
Theory exhibit counterfactual implications for optimal wagers at actuarially unfair odds. 
In particular they imply individuals may maximizes their utility, called value function in 
Cumulative Prospect Theory, by wagering all or large proportions of their wealth on 
actuarially unfair gambles.  In order to eliminate this property it is necessary that loss 
aversion is unbounded and increases as stake size increases.  We present new parametric 
specifications of the value function over losses that exhibit this feature and therefore 
eliminate the ruinous wagering property.  
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Introduction  
The purpose in this note is to set out new parametric specifications of the value function 
over losses in Cumulative Prospect Theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). These new 
specifications eliminate a counterfactual implication of extant specifications such as 
exponential and logarithmic for optimal wagering at actuarially unfair odds.
1
 In particular 
with the exception of power value functions, which also exhibit counterfactual 
implications for optimal wagering,
2
 the degree of loss aversion is finite in extant 
specifications. This property leads to ruinous wagers exhibiting positive expected value 
in CPT.  The rationale is that in extant specifications of CPT both the loss and gain value 
functions “flatten out” due to diminishing absolute sensitivity for deep enough losses and 
gains. Consequently if loss aversion approaches a non-infinite upper bound it is possible 
to draw a tangent from deep in the loss domain, (at high stake levels) that is above the 
value function in the gain domain implying positive expected value of ruinous actuarially 
unfair binary wagers with high probability of a win.
3
  
It is not the case that wealthy individuals are typically observed wagering all or near all 
of their wealth on actuarially unfair gambles. It is therefore a counterfactual implication 
of CPT. 
                                                          
1
 See Conte et al (2011) and Scholten and Read (2014) for recent  estimates of exponential and 
logarithmic value functions. 
2
 This is because power value specifications imply infinite gain-seeking behavior as symmetric 
gains and losses tend to zero as shown by Köbberling and Wakker (2005). The infinite gain 
seeking property over small enough stakes results in an individual optimally wagering on any 
actuarially unfair gamble. This occurs even in the absence of probability distortion or under-
weighting of all probabilities. This is demonstrated by Law and Peel (2007a).  
 
Kahneman (2003) offers one solution that would remove the ruinous property. He   
hypothesised that for expected losses near ruin the intrinsic value of money becomes so 
salient that it will dominate psychological perception, yielding concave utility. This 
assumption would remove the property of wealthy individuals wagering all of their 
wealth.
4
 However this assumption would not stop agents wagering large proportions of 
their wealth, say fifty percent. Wagers of this proportion of wealth are not typically 
observed and therefore we seemingly require an alternative method to remove the ruinous 
wagering property. 
More recently Kahneman (2011, p. 284) has hypothesised that loss aversion could in 
principle become infinite. He writes “What about a possible loss of $500 on a coin toss? 
What possible gain do you require to offset it? What about a loss of $2000? As you 
carried out this exercise, you probably found that your loss aversion coefficient tends to 
increase when the stakes rise, but not dramatically. All bets are off, of course, if the 
possible loss is potentially ruinous, or if your life style is threatened. The loss aversion 
coefficient is very large in such cases and may even be infinite-…” In fact our analysis 
demonstrates loss aversion has to be unbounded so that CPT does not exhibit 
counterfactual implications for wagering. 
 
The remainder of the note is structured as follows. In section 1 we illustrate the 
potentially ruinous gambling property. In section 2 we set out new specifications of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3
  Cain et al. (2008) and Ebert and Strack (2015) note this possibility but do not provide a 
solution. 
4
 We note that for actual as opposed to perceived large losses the experimental evidence on risky 
preferences is mixed. Some researchers report more risk-seeking behavior and others more risk-
aversion. (See e.g. Cameron and Shah (2015)). 
CPT value function over losses which can eliminate this property. The last section is a 
brief conclusion. 
 
Section 1 Potentially Ruinous Gambles and Loss Aversion 
In Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) it is assumed 
that from a reference point agent’s value function over gains is everywhere risk-averse 
and the value function over losses everywhere risk-seeking. Agents are also assumed to 
be loss-averse so that the curve falls faster over losses than it rises over gains. It is also 
assumed that the representative agent’s subjective probability of an outcome differs from 
the objective via an inverted s-shaped probability weighting function where small 
probabilities are over weighted and larger ones under weighted. It is the over weighting 
of smaller probabilities that can help explain wagering by an individual on actuarially 
unfair gambles with small winning probabilities. Subjective expected rates of return and 
hence subjective expected value could be large for small probability outcomes. The 
curvature of the value functions in conjunction with the probability distortion implies the 
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. Individuals are risk-seeking over low-probability gains 
and high probability losses and risk-averse over high-probability gains and low 
probability losses. 
To illustrate the ruinous wagering property in extant specifications we consider a 
parametric form of the CPT based on exponential value functions. (See Cain et al (2008). 
Exponential value functions have been found to provide a parsimonious fit to 
experimental data  (see e.g. Conte (2011)) and also resolve a number of theoretical and 
empirical objections to power value specifications in CPT apart from the implications for 
wagering noted above.
5
 With exponential value functions the expected value, V, of a 
binary wager is given by  
V w p w pe eso s     ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 11                                                   (1)  
Where p is the win probability, s is the stake and o is odds. w p p ( ) ( ) and w- 1  are the 
probability weighting functions over gains and losses and ,  and   are positive 
constants.  
The degree of loss aversion, as defined by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), is the ratio of 
the utility loss to the utility gain for a symmetric gamble. With exponential value 
functions Peel and Law (2007b) demonstrate that the upper limit on loss aversion is given 
by  and that we also require  >   to ensure the marginal value of a gain is always less 
than the marginal value of a loss of the same amounts.  
The upper bound on loss aversion,  , in the exponential specification  implies that 
expected value is positive for a wager at actuarially unfair odds at a high enough win 
probability. This is easily demonstrated if we assume for simplicity a wager of infinite 
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5
 For example Reiger and Bui (2011) demonstrate that in risky choice lotteries with two positive 
outcomes CPT, with power value functions assumed, cannot model plausible certainty 
equivalents of the risky lotteries. He and Xun (2011) demonstrate that loss aversion may have to 
become very large or infinite to generate sensible predictions for portfolio choice in CPT. 
 
To illustrate the ruinous property we employ the specifications and parameter values of 
the probability weighting functions over gains and losses assumed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992)
6
 and exponential parameters of   00011. ,  0 001.  and   2 475. . 
With these parameter values an individual would obtain positive expected value by 
wagering $12 on one number at US roulette. They would obtain negative expected utility 
by wagering on thirty-five different numbers simultaneously but only when total wager 
size is less than $21553. By wagering more than $22238 on thirty-five numbers they 
obtain higher expected value than the $12 wager and the expected value continues to rise 
until wager size is equal to total wealth - a potentially ruinous gamble. In fact a wager of 
size of $35000 has 35 times the expected value of the $12 wager.
7
 
Section 2 Removing the Ruinous Wagering Property from CPT 
We can embody the assumption that loss aversion increases without bound as stake size 
increases by introducing a linear term into the exponential specification of the value 
function over losses in (1). The new specification of the value function over losses, V (L), 
is therefore given by  
V L se s( ) ( )    1                                                                                        (4) 
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7
 It is important to note that the property that agents would be willing to undertake potentially 
ruinous wagers in CPT is not a consequence of the fact that the exponential value functions are 
bounded. For example the logarithmic specifications of the CPT value functions, recently 
suggested by Scholten and Read (2014), also exhibit the ruinous wagering property.  Results 
available on request. 
Retaining the exponential specification over gains as in (1) and the same constants to aid 














s                                                                                                 (5) 
Since    it is clear from (5) that loss aversion now exhibits no upper limit as stake size 
increases. All the other properties of CPT assumed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) with 
regard to the curvature of the value functions over gains (everywhere risk-averse) and losses 
(everywhere risk-seeking) are exhibited in these specifications of the value functions.  
For the same value of the parameters employed in the example above the new specification 




We note that there is a tension between the estimates of loss aversion reported in 
experimental research and the degree of loss aversion required eliminating the ruinous 
wagering property. The experimental estimates of loss aversion reported are typically in 
the range of 0.7 to 5 (see e.g. Harinck (2007), Abdellaoui et al. (2007)).  However these 
estimates of loss aversion are derived from experimental lotteries with relatively small 
gains and losses. There is no experimental evidence of loss aversion for very large losses. 
However regardless of the experimental results reported to date on loss aversion it is the 
case that loss aversion has to increase with stake size if CPT is to offer a model of 




We showed that extant models of Cumulative Prospect Theory imply individuals will 
obtain positive expected value by engaging in ruinous wagers. To eliminate this property 
we showed that loss aversion has to increase without bound as stake size increases. We 
presented new parametric specifications of the value function over losses, which 
embodies this property. The specifications can exhibit small degrees of loss aversion over 
small stakes and has sensible implications for optimal wagering at all stake levels.  
 It would be of interest to estimate these new value functions employing experimental or 
field data involving small and large losses. The implications for the insurance of rare 
events in CPT also appear of interest. 
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